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JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND DE NOVO REVIEW IN
LITIGATION OVER NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION UNDER THE FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT
ROBERT

I.

P.

DEYLING*

INTRODUCTION

T-HERE is inherent tension between broad public access to
government information and secrecy in the name of "national security." Congress tried to address that problem through
the 1966 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),' a law that established procedures the public could use to obtain access to a wide
range of government information. Among other things, the
FOIA granted the federal courts the power to review executive
agency decisions to withhold classified information from the public. In 1974 Congress amended the FOIA to require courts to
conduct de novo review of agency classification claims and to authorize courts to inspect classified documents in camera if
2
necessary.
Since the enactment of the 1974 amendments, courts have
ruled on hundreds of cases involving classified information, 3 affirming the government's decision to withhold the requested information in nearly every case. 4 The one-sided nature of these
results might appear strange in light of the congressional mandate to scrutinize agency decisions. It is this author's belief that
the apparently prevailing view among scholars of the FOIA, that
the courts must "defer" to agency declarations regarding national
security information, 5 is a misreading of the history of the FOIA.
* Staff Attorney, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. B.A. 1982, Stanford University; J.D. 1987, New York University.
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988). Congress passed the FOIA in 1966, and it went
into effect in 1967.
2. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B) ("[T]he court shall determine the matter de novo, and
may examine the contents of such agency records in camera .... ).
3. Research reveals over 200 United States District Court opinions on
FOIA cases involving the (b)(1) national security exemption. Many of these
cases are described in the OFFICE OF INFO. AND PRIVACY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CASE LIST

(Sept. 1991 ed.) [hereinafter

FREEDOM OF

INFORMATION CASE LIST].

4. For a discussion of the few cases in which courts have rejected government withholding claims, see infra notes 125-38 and accompanying text.
5. For further discussion of the role of agency declarations, also known as

(67)
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Judicial deference is not an accurate description of the role assigned to the courts in reviewing FOIA national security cases.
This article contends that one reason plaintiffs seldom persuade courts to order the government to release "secret" information is that judicial treatment of these cases fails to fully
implement the reforms Congress intended when it passed the
1974 amendments. Rather than expanding the scope of judicial
inquiry into the procedural and substantive legality of withholding information, opinions issued both before and after the 1974
amendments have established a lenient standard of review in
FOIA national security cases. That standard, in essence, will validate any "reasonable" executive agency decision to withhold such
information.
At present, Congress is considering amendments to the
FOIA that would clarify the courts' role in FOIA national security
cases. 6 This article, however, focuses on judicial review under the
current law as an essential check on executive secrecy. This author contends that the courts could be doing a more thorough job
at this difficult task by actively using the de novo review power
already granted by Congress.
The courts are the first and only forum in which unsuccessful
FOIA requesters have the opportunity to present the case in favor
of disclosure. 7 FOIA requesters are entitled to a written appeal
to the agency that denied the request, but have no legal right to
force the agency to consider legal or factual arguments in favor of
disclosure. 8 In court, however, an individual whose request for
"Vaughn affidavits," in FOIA national security litigation, see infra notes 26-30
and accompanying text.
6. One such proposed amendment would require the courts to engage in a
"balancing test" when reviewing FOIA cases involving classified documents. A
draft Senate bill would change the language of FOIA exemption I to make documents exempt from disclosure only if they are:
(1) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive
Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and are(A) in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(B) matters the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable damage to national defense or foreign policy; and
(C) matters in which the need to protect the information outweighs the public interest in disclosure.
S. 1939, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1991) (Nov. 12, 1991 version) (emphasis
added); see also H.R. 1423, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 107 (1991) (Mar. 14, 1991
version) (containing similar provision).
7. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988) (setting forth role of district court
where suit is filed seeking release of information under FOIA).
8. See id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (requiring agency that denies request for infor-
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information has been denied lacks precise knowledge of the subject matter of the litigation, making a test of the government's
claim in an adversarial setting nearly impossible. Arrayed against
the FOIA plaintiff and, in a sense, against the court, is the considerable executive branch apparatus set up to classify information
in the interest of national security. Courts therefore face a dual
challenge when reviewing executive branch decisions to withhold
classified information. Courts must protect the confidentiality of
"properly classified" information while simultaneously requiring
the government to justify keeping secrets from the public.
A quick review of some recent FOIA requests denied by the
government for reasons of national security gives a sense of both
the type of information that is the subject of litigation, as well as
the sometimes inscrutable nature of government opposition to
the disclosure of information:
-The FBI refused to release documents relating to its
"Library Awareness Program," a nationwide campaign
to recruit librarians to monitor the reading habits of foreigners in public and university libraries. 9
-The government refused to release documents that
the FBI gathered twenty years ago while investigating
singer John Lennon. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently ruled that the government had not justified its claim that releasing the
information would endanger national security.' 0
-The government refused to release thousands of
pages of material relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis,
despite the passage of thirty years and dramatic changes
in world politics. The documents are believed to include
details of United States plans to topple the Castro government in the early 1960s through economic pressure
and military action.I'
mation to advise person requesting information of right to appeal adverse determination to head of agency); id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii) (requiring agency that denies
appeal from adverse determination to advise person requesting information of
right to judicial review).
9. See National Sec. Archive v. FBI, 759 F. Supp. 872, 874-75 (D.D.C. 1991).
10. See Wiener v. FBI, 943 F.2d 972, 976-77, 980 (9th Cir. 1991).
11. See Brenner v. United States Dep't of State, Civil Action No. 88-0034
(D.D.C. filed Jan. 7, 1988). Correspondence between President Kennedy and
Soviet Secretary General Khrushchev relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis was
also a subject of the Brenner case. The letters were declassified in January of
1992 after the United States and Russian governments reached an agreement to
publish the letters jointly. Department Releases Kennedy-Khrushchev Correspondence
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This article first will review the background of the "national
security" exemption 12 to the FOIA and the legislative history of
the 1974 FOIA amendments that affected that exemption. Next,
the article briefly traces the development of the case law, both
before and after the 1974 amendments, relating to the national
security exemption. The article analyzes the judicial treatment of
FOIA national security cases and considers the standard of review
appropriate in such cases. Finally, the article examines litigation
strategies and judicial procedures that, if widely adopted, could
make the adjudication of these cases approximate more closely
13
what Congress intended in passing the FOIA.
II.

HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTION

(1966-1973)
Congress designed the FOIA to establish ajudicially enforceable right of access by any person to federal agency records. As
summarized in the Justice Department Guide to the Freedom of Information Act: "[U]nder the thrust and structure of the FOIA, virtually
every record possessed by a federal agency must be made available to the public in one form or another, unless it is specifically
exempted from disclosure or specially excluded from the Act's
coverage in the first place." 14 Information that executive branch
officials determine must be "kept secret in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy," also known as "classified" informal5
tion, is exempt from disclosure under the FOIA.
Executive officials classify particular documents by following
the terms of an executive order defining the standards for classifying information.16 Likewise, the FOIA adopts the executive oron Cuban Missile Crisis, Department of State Dispatch, Jan. 13, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Exec. Library, DSTATE File.
12. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1988). The national security exemption is
commonly known as the "(b)(1) exemption," a reference to the section of the
FOIA that exempts properly classified information from disclosure.
13. The adjudication process could also be affected by congressional action
more clearly defining the courts' role in deciding national security cases, coupled with improved congressional oversight of the classification process itself.
This article, however, does not focus on congressional action, but instead on the
courts and their role in deciding FOIA national security cases. For further analysis of the potential for congressional influence in the declassification process,
see Note, Keeping Secrets: Congress, The Courts, and National Security Information, 103
HARV. L. REV. 906 (1990).

14. Office of Info. and Privacy,JusticeDept Guide to the Freedom of Information
Act, in FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CASE LIST, supra note 3, at 387, 389 [hereinaf-

ter Justice Dep't Guide].
15. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
16. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983), reprinted in 50
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der as the standard for withholding material from the public
under the (b)(1) exemption. Under the FOIA as amended, a document need not be disclosed if it is "specifically authorized under
criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy" and is "in fact
properly classified pursuant to such Executive order."' 7 In response to a FOIA request, the government reviews all relevant
information in light of the executive order and decides which information should remain classified, be declassified, or be newly
classified. "'

While ostensibly promoting the public's "right to know," in
drafting the FOIA Congress left unchanged the Executive's broad
discretion to classify large amounts of information on the ground
U.S.C. § 401 note (1988). This is the executive order currently in effect. It was
issued by President Reagan and became effective on August 1, 1982. Executive
Order No. 12,356 provides that information shall be classified if it falls into one
of ten categories and if "its unauthorized disclosure, either by itself or in the
context of other information, reasonably could be expected to cause damage to
the national security." Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 1.3(b), 3 C.F.R. at 169. The
10 classification categories are:
1. military plans, weapons, or operations;
2. the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations,
projects, or plans relating to the national security;
3. foreign government information;
4. intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence
sources or methods;
5. foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
6. scientific, technological or economic matters relating to the national security;
7. United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear
materials or facilities;
8. cryptology;
9. a confidential source; or
10. other categories of information that are related to the national security and that require protection against unauthorized disclosure
as determined by the President or by agency heads or other officials who have been delegated original classification authority by
the President.
Id. § 1.3(a), 3 C.F.R. at 168-69.
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
18. See Justice Dep't Guide, supra note 14, at 424 ("[I]t is well settled that information may be 'classified or reclassified' after it has been requested under the
FOIA."). In the case of material that is classified only after a FOIA request is
made, the request itself apparently creates the need to classify information the
government did not previously see a need to protect. Also, entire classes of
information may be presumed exempt without regard to classification status,
such as information on Central Intelligence Agency sources and methods, which
is covered by FOIA exemption 3. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(B). That exemption
provides that matters "specifically exempted from disclosure" under other statutes are also exempt under FOIA. See also CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 181 (1985)
(director of CIA was justified in withholding information exempted from disclosure by National Security Act of 1947).
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that public disclosure would affect national security or foreign
policy.' 9 Congress left enforcement of the new disclosure standards to the federal courts, which were granted "jurisdiction to
enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order
the production of any agency records improperly withheld from
the complainant." 20 In adjudicating such matters, the court is to
"determine the matter de novo," and "the burden is on the
2
agency to sustain its action." '
FOIA litigation is unusual because the government holds all
of the information necessary for impartial judicial review and adversarial testing of the government's reasons for withholding documents from the FOIA requester. Neither the plaintiff nor the
court has knowledge of the specific identity or content of the
withheld documents. In early FOIA cases, a common government strategy was to file a motion for summary judgment along
with an affidavit stating that the documents were properly withheld because they fell within the scope of one of the nine FOIA
exemptions.2 2 At that point the burden would effectively shift to
the court to determine, through time-consuming review of individual documents, whether the government's arguments were
23
justified.
The courts soon realized that extensive in camera review in
every FOIA case would be "very burdensome" and "necessarily
conducted without benefit of criticism and illumination by a party
with the actual interest in forcing disclosure." 24 To solve this
problem, the courts developed as an alternative to in camera review a procedure that requires the government to prepare a "relatively detailed analysis [of each withheld document] in
25
manageable segments."
In the landmark case of Vaughn v. Rosen, 26 which has been
widely followed, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit ruled that to justify withholding information under the
FOIA, the government must describe the withheld documents for
19. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
20. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (mere
conclusory affidavit by government agency asserting that documents sought
were exempted by FOIA held to be insufficient), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 825.
25. Id. at 826.
26. 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
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the court and the plaintiff2 7 and establish how each document is
exempt from disclosure.2 8 Such descriptions and justifications,
known as "Vaughn indexes" or "Vaughn affidavits," have become a
near-universal requirement in FOIA cases of all types.2 9 This
procedure is so important to FOIA litigation that summary judgment decisions are often made solely on the basis of the "adequacy" of the government pleadings, with in camera review
employed only when the court cannot decide on the basis of document descriptions alone.3 0
Few cases involving classified documents were decided between 1966, when the FOIA was passed, and 1974, when Congress amended the FOIA to strengthen the judicial review
procedure in cases involving classified information. These cases
reveal that the courts saw their role in FOIA national security
cases as extremely limited, reflecting long-standing judicial reluctance to be perceived as second-guessing the executive branch on
matters relating to foreign policy and national security. Typical
of this attitude was Epstein v. Resor,3 l a case decided in 1970 that
involved an historian's request for information on the forced repatriation of anti-communist Russians following World War 11.32
The court ruled in favor of the government, holding that the
scope of judicial review in (b)(1) cases was not de novo, but instead was limited to deciding whether the agency's classification
decision was "clearly arbitrary and unsupportable. ' 3 3 The court
of appeals affirmed, noting that "what is desirable in the interest
of national defense and foreign policy is not the sort of question
34
that courts are designed to deal with."
In Soucie v. David,3 5 decided in 1971, the plaintiffs sought a
government report evaluating development of the supersonic
transport airplane. The government cited the (b)(1) exemption,
27. Id. at 826-28.
28. Id. at 828.
29. See, e.g., Wiener v. FBI, 943 F.2d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring
FBI to produce adequate Vaughn index); Osborn v. IRS, 754 F.2d 195, 197 (6th
Cir. 1985) (trial court erred by failing to require IRS to produce Vaughn index).
30. See Justice Dep't Guide, supra note 14, at 632.
31. 296 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Cal. 1969), af'd, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
32. Id. at 215.
33. Id. at 217.
34. Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965
(1970).
35. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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among others, as justification for withholding the report. 3 6
Although the court asserted that in camera inspection of withheld
information might be appropriate even in a (b)(1) case, the court
ruled that inspection was unnecessary "if the Government describes [the document's] relevant features sufficiently to satisfy
3 7
the court that the claim of privilege is justified."In the early 1970s, tension increased between Congress and
the President concerning secret information and policies. In the
midst of court challenges to the government's attempt to prohibit
publication of the Pentagon Papers, which were secret plans concerning the Vietnam War, the House Committee on Government
Operations began hearings in 1971 focusing on executive privilege and First Amendment issues. 38 These hearings soon evolved
into a wholesale evaluation of the FOIA. 39
A 1972 House report 40 based on the hearings found that operation of the FOIA had been "hindered by 5 years of foot-dragging by the bureaucracy," and recommended significant
legislative reforms. 4 ' The report focused mainly on problems
with administration of the FOIA by the federal agencies, noting
that too few cases had been decided by the courts to discern
trends in the case law.42 Foreshadowing the 1974 amendments,
however, the report said that while "the courts' judgment has
usually been against needless government secrecy," the courts
had been "generally reluctant" to order disclosure when the government argued that documents were covered by the (b)(1)
exemption .43
Meanwhile, skepticism about government secrecy was growing as the revelations of Watergate slowly came to light. By early
1973, bills to amend the FOIA were introduced in both the House
36. Id. at 1072.
37. Id. at 1080.
38. See United States Government Information Policies and Practices-Administration
and Operation of the Freedom of Information Act: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Foreign
Operations and Government Information of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
92d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., pts. 4-6 (1972) [hereinafter Hearings]. Soon after
the hearings began the Supreme Court ruled that the government could not
enjoin publication of the Pentagon Papers. See New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
39. See generally Hearings, supra note 38.
40. COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, ADMINISTRATION OF THE FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT, H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
41. Id.at 8.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 9. 71.
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and Senate.4 4 Pressure mounted from many quarters for reform
in information-access laws, but perhaps the greatest impetus for
change in the way classified information was reviewed by the
courts came from the first Supreme Court decision interpreting
the proper role of the courts in FOIA national security cases.
The plaintiffs in Environmental ProtectionAgency v. Mink 4 5 were
members of Congress who sought access to a secret report on
proposals for nuclear weapons testing in Alaska. The Supreme
Court ruled that, unlike FOIA litigation involving the eight other
categories of exempt documents, Congress had not intended to
grant courts the power to review in camera documents that the
government claimed were exempt for reasons of national security. 4 6 The government needed to prove only 1) that the document was in fact classified, and 2) that the document fell within
the range of subjects protected from disclosure by an executive
order. 4 7 These assertions could be made in a government affidavit, and the court was not permitted to review the requested documents to test the government's word. 48 Under the Mink analysis,
the mere fact of classification was enough to justify withholding
49
the documents from the public.
After the Mink decision, lower courts interpreted the judicial
role in FOIA national security cases more restrictively. Wolfe v.
Froehlke,50 one of the few cases decided before the 1974 amendments effectively overruled Mink, held that "absent allegations of
fraud or subterfuge the Court is not to look beyond the fact of
procedurally proper classification of documents pursuant to Exec51
utive Order."
From the plaintiff's perspective, FOIA litigation over the
(b)(1) exemption looked ever more hopeless. Justice Stewart,
concurring in Mink, had pointed out, however, that it was "Congress, not the Court, that in [the (b)(1) exemption] has ordained
44. SUBCOMM. ON GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS & SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94th CONG., IST
SESS., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (Pub. L. No. 93502) SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 11011 (It. Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter SOURCE BOOK].
45. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
46. Id. at 84.
47. Id.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 358 F. Supp. 1318 (D.D.C. 1973), aft'd, 510 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
51. Id. at 1320.
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unquestioning deference to the Executive's use of the 'secret'
stamp." 52 In what many interpreted as an invitation to Congress
to correct a shortcoming in the law, Justice Stewart wrote that he
read the FOIA as giving the courts "no means to question an Executive decision to stamp a document 'secret,' however cynical,
myopic, or even corrupt that decision might have been." 5 3 Congress wasted no time taking up the amendment challenge, prodded, perhaps, by the climate of distrust prevalent in the aftermath
of Watergate.
III.

THE 1974 FOIA AMENDMENTS

Congress passed the 1974 FOIA amendments twice by an
overwhelming majority, the second time overriding President
Ford's veto. 54 The original vote was close to unanimous-383 to
8 in the House and 64 to 17 in the Senate. 55 Congress overrode
the President's veto by a vote of 371 to 31 in the House, and 65 to
56
27 in the Senate.
The amendments, which also dealt with various issues unrelated to the national security exemption, 5 7 were designed to affect
judicial treatment of national security information in four basic
ways. First, the amendments directed the courts to evaluate government exemption claims under (b)(1) by determining de novo
whether records were properly withheld. 58 Second, the amendments specifically authorized in camera inspection of withheld
documents at the court's discretion in all FOIA cases, even those
involving classified information.5 9 Third, the amendments
shielded from disclosure only information that was properly classified "pursuant to both procedural and substantive criteria contained in [the] Executive order." 60 Finally, the amendments
52. Mink, 410 U.S. at 94 (Stewart, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 95 (Stewart, J., concurring).
54. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 44, at 276-79 (House vote), 366 (Senate vote),
431-34 (House vote to override veto), 480 (Senate vote to override veto).
55. Id. at 276-79 (House vote), 366 (Senate vote).
56. Id. at 431-34 (House vote to override veto), 480 (Senate vote to override veto).
57. Id. at 225-27. The amendments also contained provisions dealing with
appeals, responses to complaints, assessments of attorneys' fees, sanctions and

deadlines. Id.
58. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988).
59. Id.

60. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 44, at 229 (reprinting H.R. CONF. REP. No.
1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). The Conference Report to accompany H.R. 12471, the 1974 FOIA amendments, was also published
as S. CONF. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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required that "any reasonably segregable portion of a record
shall be provided after deletion of the portions which are
exempt." 6 1
In the wake of the 1974 amendments, the courts looked to
the legislative history to define the proper scope ofjudicial review
in FOIA cases involving national security information. Therefore, it is useful to review the legislative history in some detail.
Although the final versions of the House and Senate bills
were nearly identical with respect to the treatment of national security information, an earlier Senate version differed significantly
regarding the standard courts should apply when reviewing (b)(1)
claims. The version of the bill reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee would have required a court to rule in favor of the
government "unless, following its in camera examination, it finds
the withholding is without a reasonable basis" under the criteria
62
of an executive order.
When the bill reached the Senate floor, however, Senator
Muskie introduced a substitute version deleting the "reasonableness" standard. 63 He successfully argued that such a lenient standard would render judicial review meaningless, as judges would
apply a near-presumption that executive agency decisions were
reasonable. 64 The Senate passed the Muskie version of the bill,
leaving the "criteria established by an Executive order" as the
only standard against which the courts could judge (b)(1) cases.
Opponents of the bill, including President Nixon and President Ford (who took office before the bill was passed), objected to
the de novo review provisions as unwarranted congressional restrictions on executive branch discretion to protect information in
the interest of national security. They viewed a "reasonableness"
standard as more palatable, however, because a presumption that
the government acted reasonably in classifying information was
unlikely to result in many rulings against the government in (b)(1)
cases.
Once the House and Senate each passed the bill, they appointed a Conference Committee to resolve technical differences
between the two versions of the FOIA amendments. While the
Conference Committee was meeting, President Ford sent it a let61. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
62. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 44, at 189 (reprinting S. REP. No. 854, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)).
63. Id. at 302-05 (Amendment No. 1356).
64. Id. at 328 (amendment passed by vote of 56 to 29).
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ter questioning the constitutionality of the judicial review provisions for cases involving national security information. 65 He
requested that Congress add to the bill an "express presumption
that the classification was proper" and make clear that a court
could only order the government to disclose information "if it
finds the classification to have been arbitrary, capricious, or with66
out a reasonable basis."
The Conference Committee responded with a letter to the
President stating that the Committee believed his fears regarding
in camera review were "unfounded," but that the Committee had
"nonetheless agreed to include additional explanatory language
in the [Conference Report] making clear [the Committee's] intentions on this issue."' 6 7 In sum, the Conference Committee rejected the President's arguments while attempting to strike a
compromise with him to avoid a veto of the bill.
The Conference Report has been cited often by the courts
since 1974 as definitive evidence that Congress meant the courts
to show deference toward executive agency claims that information is properly classified. For that reason it merits reprinting
here at length:
[T]he conferees recognize that the Executive departments responsible for national defense and foreign policy matters have unique insights into what adverse affects
[sic] might occur as a result of public disclosure of a particular classified record. Accordingly, the conferees expect that Federal courts, in making de novo
determinations in section 552(b)(1) cases under the
Freedom of Information law, will accord substantial
weight to an agency's affidavit concerning the details of
68
the classified status of the disputed record.
The President vetoed the bill despite that admonition to the
courts, claiming that the judicial review provisions would "violate
constitutional principles" because "a determination by the Secretary of Defense that disclosure of a document would endanger
our national security would, even though reasonable, have to be
65. Id. at 368-70 (reprinting Letter from President Ford to Senator Kennedy dated Aug. 20, 1974).
66. Id. at 369.
67. Id. at 370, 371 (reprinting Letter from Senator Kennedy and Congressman Moorhead to President Ford dated Sept. 23, 1974).
68. Id. at 229 (reprinting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974)).
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overturned by a district judge who thought the plaintiff's position
69
just as reasonable."
Although the language relating to the (b)(1) exemption in
the Conference Report certainly suggests that Congress intended
for the courts to take notice of agency expertise in cases involving
classified documents, the language also must be read in the context of other relevant legislative history. That history includes the
remainder of the Conference Report 70 and a separate committee
report on the House and Senate versions of the amendments, 7' in
addition to transcripts of House and Senate floor debates on the
bill itself, 72 debates on adoption of the conference report and de73
bates on the vote to override President Ford's veto.
Despite the Conference Committee's expectation that courts
would give government evidence "substantial weight," the legislative history as a whole reveals that Congress did not intend the
courts simply to rubber-stamp agency decisions based solely on a
reading of a government affidavit attesting to the proper classification of a particular document. Such highly deferential judicial
review was, after all, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
FOIA in the Mink case that Congress sought to overrule.
The Conference Report reiterates that judicial review in
(b)(1) cases shall be "de novo," that "[t]he burden remains on the
government" to prove that information is properly classified, and
that "[w]hile in camera examination need not be automatic, in
74
many situations it will plainly be necessary and appropriate."
The House and Senate committee reports, although dealing
with slightly different bills than what ultimately became law, illuminate the judicial review issue as it was presented to the full
House and Senate for debate. The Senate Report explains that
the courts should "inquire during de novo review not only into
the superficial evidence-a 'Secret' stamp on a document or set of
records-but also into the inherent justification for the use of
such a stamp." 75 As a result, "a government affidavit certifying
the classification of material pursuant to executive order will no
69. Id. at 483-85 (reprinting Message from the President of the United
States Vetoing H.R. 12471 dated Oct. 17, 1974).

70. Id. at 217-32.
71. Id. at 119-216.
72. Id. at 235-80 (House debate), 281-366 (Senate debate).
73. Id. at 431-34 (House vote), 480 (Senate vote).
74. Id. at 226 (reprinting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.

(1974)).
75. Id. at 182 (reprinting S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)).
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longer ring the curtain down on an applicant's effort to bring
76
such material to public light."
The Senate Report recognized that de novo review "may impose an additional burden on judges," and suggested that courts
give "appropriate consideration" to the results of any classification review already conducted within the executive branch. 7 7 The
Senate, however, strongly emphasized the importance of impartial review by the courts:
It is essential... to the proper workings of the Freedom
of Information Act that any executive branch review, itself, be reviewable outside the executive branch. And
the courts-when necessary, using special masters or expert consultants of their own choosing to help in such
sophisticated determinations-are the only forums now
available in which such review can properly be
78
conducted.
The House Report stated that the amendment "means that
the court, if it chooses to undertake review of a classification determination, including examination of the records in camera, may
look at the reasonableness or propriety of the determination to
classify the records under the terms of the Executive order."' 79
The House and Senate floor debates on the amendments
show a Congress nearly unanimous in its desire to direct the
courts to review FOIA national security cases in a manner similar
80
to any other type of FOIA case.
Congressman Moorhead, one of the primary drafters of the
amendments, 8 ' noted that the amendments were intended to
change the way FOIA (b)(1) cases were treated in the courts in
two basic ways. First, the amendments would establish that a
court may review withheld documents in camera if the government affidavit did not satisfy the court that the information at is76. Id.
77. Id. at 183.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 127 (reprinting H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)).
80. See id. at 235-80 (House debate), 281-366 (Senate debate).
81. Id. at 110. Congressman William S. Moorhead was one of the members
of the Conference Committee on the FOIA amendments. Other conferees were
Congressmen Chet Holifield, John E. Moss, Bill Alexander, Frank Horton, John
N. Erlenborn, and Paul McCloskey, and Senators Edward Kennedy, Philip A.
Hart, Birch Bayh, Quentin Burdick, John Tunney, and Charles McC. Mathias.
Id. at 117, 223.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss1/2

14

Deyling: Judicial Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation over National

19921

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

sue remained properly classified. 8 2 Second, the amendments
would "authorize[] a court to look behind a security classification
label to see if a record deserved classification under the 'criteria'
83
of an Executive order."
On the Senate side, Senator Muskie successfully argued for
the deletion of the presumption of reasonableness that he believed the original version of the Senate bill contained. He argued that to "constrict the manner in which courts may perform
this vital review function" would make the agency officials who
classify documents "privileged officials, almost immune from...
accountability.'"a4
The floor debates also demonstrate that most members of
Congress believed that federal judges were qualified to review executive secrecy claims.8 5 Congressman Moss, a member of the
House committee that crafted the amendments, told his colleagues that he "d[id] not think we have to make dummies out of
[udges] by insisting they accept without question an affidavit
from some bureaucrat-anxious to protect his decisions whether
they be good or bad-that a particular document was properly
classified and should remain secret." 8 6 Congressman Moss further stated that "it is the intent of the committee that the Federal
courts be free to employ whatever means they find necessary to
discharge their responsibilities. This was also the intent in 1966
when Congress acted, but these two amendments contained in
87
the bill before you today make it crystal clear."
The amendments, then, left the courts with a mandate to
scrutinize carefully executive agency claims that information is exempt from the FOIA on national security grounds. At the same
time, however, Congress gave the courts no new standard to apply in making the factual determination that a particular document deserves protection from disclosure. Instead, the courts
were directed to verify that a document was properly classified
under the "criteria established by an Executive order."88 Congress further complicated the matter by reminding the courts, in
the Conference Report, that agency officials were likely to be in
the best position to judge the "adverse effects" that might result
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 239 (statement of Congressman Moorhead).
Id.
Id. at 305 (statement of Senator Muskie).
See, e.g., id. at 257 (statement of Congressman Moss).
Id.
Id. at 258.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A) (1988).
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from disclosure.8 9
IV.

AFTERMATH OF THE AMENDMENTS

Soon after the amendments took effect, the courts had the
opportunity to interpret the new congressional directives. Those
who expected a dramatic change in the way courts treated FOIA
cases involving classified documents were to be disappointed.
Although many litigants have requested in camera inspection and
tried to challenge the sufficiency of government affidavits in (b)(1)
cases, courts have continued to routinely grant summary judgment for the government in such cases.
In Ray v. Turner,90 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, which has established many precedents in the
interpretation of the FOIA, prescribed in camera review as a way
of assuring complete de novo review even where there was no
showing of government bad faith.9 1 The case involved a plaintiff's FOIA request to the CIA for "any file you may have on
92
me."
The Ray decision seemed to offer other FOIA plaintiffs a
glimmer of hope that (b)(1) litigation would become less onesided. According to the Ray court, judicial review of the FOIA
national security exemption meant putting the burden on the
government to justify withholding. 93 The Ray court also stated,
however, that courts ought to give "substantial weight to an
agency's affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of
the disputed record." 9 4 The court concluded that whether and
how to conduct an in camera inspection of the documents should
rest in the sound discretion of the court, provided that the court
is "satisfied that proper procedures have been followed, and that
by its sufficient description the contested document logically falls
into the category of the exemption indicated." 9 5
Later cases, however, refined the standard for judicial review
89. See SOURCE BOOK, supra note 44, at 229 (reprinting H.R. CONF. REP. No.
1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)).
90. 587 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
91. Id. at 1195 (under FOIA exemptions granting of an in camera inspection is within discretion of trial court; agency may not rely on "exemption by
document" approach in national security cases, but must "reasonably segregate" exempt portions).
92. Id. at 1189.
93. Id. at 1194.
94. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974), reprintedin
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6290).
95. Id. at 1195.
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and narrowed a plaintiff's chances of persuading a court either to
review documents in camera or to order disclosure. 96 These
cases turned on the notion that a "reasonably detailed" government affidavit would justify judicial deference to the "expert"
opinion of the agency, and hence summary judgment in favor of
the government. 9 7 Some cases went so far as to hold that, because the court must defer to the judgment of the agency as set
forth in government affidavits regarding the classified status of
the contested documents, in camera review would seldom be appropriate at all. 98
For example, in Hayden v. National Security Agency/Central Security Service,9 9 the court held that "[w]hen the agency meets its
burden by means of affidavits, in camera review is neither necessary nor appropriate."' 10 0 As expressed in Gardels v. CentralIntelligence Agency,' 0 ' a case involving intelligence information, the
court's role is to determine "whether ...the Agency's judgment
objectively survives the test of reasonableness, good faith, specificity, and plausibility," taking into consideration the expertise of
0 2

the agency. 1

In Military Audit Project v. Casey,' 0 3 which involved a request
for information on a secret CIA operation to salvage a sunken
Soviet submarine, plaintiffs contended that they could only attack
the adequacy of the government's arguments through discovery. 10 4 The court ruled that discovery was inappropriate, leaving
plaintiffs no way to uncover evidence they could use to argue for
96. See, e.g.,
Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
97. See, e.g., id. at 148 (summary judgment granted to government where its
affidavits showed "plausibility of the alleged potential harm" from disclosure "in
a manner that is reasonably detailed rather than conclusory"); see also Miller v.
Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (information concerning alleged covert operations by CIA in Albania after World War II was exempt because disclosure would reveal how CIA deployed resources and would deter future
cooperation with agency); Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(CIA's judgment that confirmation or acknowledgement of covert contacts with
University of California would be damaging had to be accepted); Military Audit
Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (documents that disclosed
names, initials, synonyms, and official titles of CIA personnel as well as amount
of money spent on project were exempt as matters within national security
exemption).
98. See, e.g., Gardels, 689 F.2d at 1106 & n.5.
99. 608 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980).
100. Id. at 1387.
101. 689 F.2d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
102. Id. at 1105.
103. 656 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
104. Id. at 750.
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disclosure. 0 5 The court stated that "[i]n national security cases
some sacrifice to the ideals of the full adversary process are inevitable" because giving the plaintiffs more detailed information
about the withheld documents may itself reveal classified
information. 106
The government has thrown powerful roadblocks in the way
of FOIA plaintiffs. One of the most serious challenges to effective
judicial scrutiny of executive claims that the release of information will cause damage to the national security is known as the
"mosaic approach." 107 This argument against disclosure is amorphous yet effective. Basically, it rests on "the concept that apparently harmless pieces of information, when assembled together,
could reveal a damaging picture."10 8 The government draws authority for this argument from the executive order, which defines
"classified" information as that which, if disclosed, would cause
damage "either by itself or in the context of other information."' 0 9
Another argument that the courts have accepted is known as
the "Glomar denial." This term originated with FOIA cases involving documents related to government sponsorship of the
Glomar Explorer, an ocean salvage platform financed by the CIA
to raise a sunken Soviet submarine." 0 Documents connected
with the project were leaked to the press, which in turn published
many details about the operation, including the fact that it cost
over $500 million and involved secret CIA deals with reclusive
billionaire Howard Hughes.'
In response to FOIA requests,
however, the CIA refused to confirm or deny the existence of documents related to the operation.' 1 2 The purpose of the "Glomar
denial" is to allow the agency to refuse to confirm or deny the
existence of requested information if the existence or nonexistence of the information is itself classifiable.
In summary, the concept of de novo review has been narrowly interpreted in cases since the 1974 amendments. A court
recently held, for example, that the government may justify with105. Id.
106. Id. at 751.
107. See Justice Dep't Guide, supra note 14, at 425 (describing "mosaic
approach").
108. Id.
109. Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 1.3(b), 3 C.F.R. 166, 169 (1983) (emphasis
added), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 note (1988).
110. Phillippi v. CIA, 655 F.2d 1325, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1327-28.
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holding information under the (b)(1) exemption by providing
"little more than a showing that the agency's rationale is
logical."113
The courts' focus on agency "expertise" in national security
matters makes it nearly impossible for plaintiffs to counter the
government's affidavits with evidence that casts doubt on the government's arguments against disclosure. Plaintiffs who have tried
to submit opinions from their own "experts" regarding the merits
of classifying information have been stymied, because the courts
have ruled that only the government classifier can truly comprehend the need to keep a particular document classified.
For example, in Leichty v. Central Intelligence Agency," 4 the
plaintiff was a former CIA employee seeking information relating
to himself and his family in CIA files. He told the court that he
knew the contents of some of the withheld documents as a result
of his former employment, and he argued that their release would
cause no harm.'" 5 The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments of
agency bad faith and refused to accept "the invitation to substitute plaintiff's view for that of the agency."' " 6 In similar cases
courts have rejected the opinions of Senators," 17 former ambassadors," 8 retired government officials,"19 and others12 0 as a basis
for attacking the government's decision to withhold information
on national security grounds.
113. Washington Post v. United States Dep't of Defense, 766 F. Supp. 1, 6
(D.D.C. 1991) (citing Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
114. Civil Action No. 79-2064 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 1981).
115. Id., slip op. at 6.
116. Id.
117. Washington Post v. United States Dep't of Defense, Civil Action No.
84-2429, slip op. at 14 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 1987).
118. Rush v. United States Dep't of State, 748 F. Supp. 1548 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (denying former U.S. ambassador's request to disclose correspondence
between himself and presidential assistant for national security affairs regarding
secret discussions with Soviet officials).
119. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the
Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 421-22 (2d Cir. 1989) (Rear Admiral's opinions rejected as
basis for attacking government's decision to withhold information on national
security grounds).
120. Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1106 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (opinion of
former CIA agent rejected); Van Atta v. Defense Intelligence Agency,.Civil Action No. 87-1508, 1988 WL 73856, at *2 (D.D.C. July 6, 1988) (court rejected
plaintiff's contention that willingness of foreign diplomat to discuss documents
at issue showed confidentiality was unnecessary); see also Goldberg v. United
States Dep't of State, 818 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (ambassador's action in returning State Department survey forms marked "unclassified" not sufficient contrary evidence to defeat government summary judgment motion), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 904 (1988).
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Washington Post v. United States Department of Defense 12' may
have best expressed the bottom line on this issue. In that case the
plaintiff sought the release of a report on El Salvador's military
needs prepared at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 122
Senator Zorinsky, who reviewed the report as a member of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, filed an affidavit on behalf
of the plaintiff stating that release of the report would not pose a
threat to either the security of the United States or El Salvador,
and that Salvadoran officials likely anticipated its release.' 23 The
court, noting that Zorinsky was a legislative branch official without classification authority, ruled that "an affidavit that gives a
view of national security harm differing from that presented by
the government is alone not sufficient to undermine an agency's
affidavit, even when submitted by an individual knowledgeable in
24
the agency's area of expertise."'
As indicated in the preceeding discussion, courts usually accept the government's justifications and refuse to require the
agency to turn over the requested documents. Courts have, on
occasion, rejected government affidavits and ordered disclosure
of documents to the plaintiffs. In Donovan v. Federal Bureau of Investigation,' 25 which involved a FOIA request for documents relating to the murder of four American church women in El Salvador
in 1980, the district court found that the government affidavits
did not adequately describe the withheld documents and did not
establish that any harm would result from disclosure. 2 6 The
court held that "in a number of instances the explanation [for
withholding was] of such generality as to constitute in effect
merely a repetition of the exemption rather than an explanation." 12 7 After conducting an in camera inspection, the court still
saw no reason to withhold some of the documents, and ordered
the government to disclose them.' 28 The court of appeals upheld
this decision, stating that "it would be inappropriate ... to give
more deference to the FBI's characterization of the information
than did the trial court."' 129 The case was later settled, however,
121. Civil Action No. 84-2429 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 1987).
122. Id., slip op.
123. Id., slip op. at 14.
124. Id.
125. 625 F. Supp. 808 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 806 F.2d 55 (2d
Cir. 1986).
126. Id. at 811.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 814-15.
129. Donovan v. FBI, 806 F.2d 55, 60 (2d Cir. 1986).
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with the plaintiff agreeing to withdraw his request for the docut 30
ments that the trial court had ordered disclosed.
The district court in Holy Spirit Association v. Central Intelligence
Agency 131 found the agency's affidavits made such "broad, often
conclusory claims in the area of national security" that it was impossible to undertake meaningful review.' 3 2 The Supreme Court
later vacated that decision. 133 Similarly, in Fitzgibbon v. Central Intelligence Agency ' 34 the court ordered certain documents disclosed
because the CIA's affidavits were inadequate. 3 5 The court justified its decision by pointing out that the CIA had failed to offer an
"explanation why palpable harm to the national defense or foreign policy of the United States is likely to occur if information
S.. were released" and had failed to "expla[in] how the deleted
words-either alone or in context-actually communicate the allegedly sensitive information."'' 36 The CIA never disclosed the
documents, however, because the court of appeals later ruled that
the Supreme Court's decision in Central Intelligence Agency v.
Sims,' 37 relating to information on intelligence sources and meth38
ods, had superseded the lower court's ruling.
With few exceptions, nearly every court has found that the
government met its burden of persuading the court that the requested documents were properly classified. Even some judges
have acknowledged the seemingly one-sided nature of these
cases. Judge Patricia Wald of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, for example, wrote that de novo review
139
in (b)(1) cases "often seems to be done in a perfunctory way."'
She expressed concern that "the courts may be approaching too
timidly what is, in my view, their clear responsibility to inquire
130. See, Justice Dep't Guide, supra note 14, at 412.
131. 636 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1980), vacated in part, 455 U.S. 997 (1982).
132. Id. at 845 (quoting from unreported district court opinion).
133. CIA v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity, 455
U.S. 997 (1982) (vacating court of appeals' decision as moot); see alsoJustice Dep't
Guide, supra note 14, at 412 (noting that plaintiff in another case agreed to withdraw his request for information in exchange for government agreeing not to
seek to vacate appeals court decision, making that decision of questionable
value).
134. 578 F. Supp. 704 (D.D.C. 1983), rev'd in part, 911 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
135. Id. at 710.
136. Id.
137. 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
138. See Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
139. Patricia M. Wald, Two Unsolved ConstitutionalProblems, U. Pr-r. L. REV.
753, 760 (1980).
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into whether national security claims override traditional constitutional rights or liberties."'140 While Judge Wald did not argue
that specific cases had been improperly decided, she pointed out
that honoring the "statutory command" of the FOIA required
"insisting on affidavits setting out the security concerns, looking
at the documentary material in camera if necessary, [and] transmitting to the security agencies, most of whom do not like the FOIA
14
one whit, the message that they are being held to account."'
V.

BALANCING DEFERENCE TO AGENCY EXPERTISE AND

"DE Novo"

REVIEW

Review "de novo" literally means "anew."' 4 2 In the context
of administrative law, it connotes a complete review of the facts
and law without any deference to the supposed expertise of the
initial decisionmaker, the administrative agency.' 4 3 Congress
rarely directs the courts to conduct such a thorough review of
agency actions; that it did so in the FOIA indicates the depth of
Congress' motivation to provide open access to the workings of
government.
The federal courts are the first and only forum in which a
FOIA requester is entitled to make an affirmative case in favor of
the disclosure of requested information. 44 A citizen requesting
information under the FOIA is not entitled to present evidence to
the agency, or to have arguments in favor of disclosure officially
14 5
considered at either the initial agency review or appeal stage.
4 6 Of
The requester has no right to a hearing at the agency level.'
course, the requester's arguments may persuade agency officials,
but the absence of the right to an adversarial proceeding at the
agency level underscores the importance ofjudicial review in the
FOIA process.
140. Id. at 764.
141. Id.
142. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990).

143. Id.
144. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
145. See id. § 552(a)(6)(C).
146. See id During the House debate on President Ford's veto of the 1974
amendments, Congressman Erlenborn pointed out that (b)(1) cases should be
decided based on a "preponderance of the evidence" standard as is the "normal
rule in civil cases." FOIA cases should not be treated like regular administrative
appeals since a FOIA denial is not the product of "adversary proceedings, public
proceedings, and the making of a record," but instead is "usually made on an
arbitrary basis of some employee of the executive branch, deciding whether or
not the document falls within the system of classification as outlined in the Executive order." SOURCE BOOK, supra note 44, at 415-16.
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At the least, then, judicial officials involved in FOIA national
security cases should perform the functions of 1) verifying that all
nonclassified material has been released; 2) confirming that all
withheld material is justifiably classified; and 3) providing a meaningful opportunity for the requester to advance arguments and
present evidence in favor of disclosure. Because the requester
has had no opportunity to argue the case at the agency level, it
seems axiomatic that the courts should give as much credit and
weight to the requester's legal and factual arguments as possible.
Courts do not have authority to decide whether documents
should be classified or not. As a practical matter, however, the
FOIA empowers, indeed it directs, the courts to overrule an executive branch decision to classify information if the government
cannot persuade the court that releasing the information would
47
cause identifiable "damage" to national security.
Courts should temper judicial deference to agency judgments by looking to the only standard by which they can measure
secrecy decisions-the executive order governing classification.
The current order allows the classification of information only if
its unauthorized disclosure "reasonably could be expected to
cause damage to the national security." 4 s This "harm standard"
means that the government's submissions to the court must explain how disclosure would cause damage to national security
and, by extension, requires reviewing courts to convince themselves that such damage would or reasonably could result from
disclosure. Evaluating whether disclosure "reasonably could be
expected to cause damage" might be seen as the true "substantive" aspect of judicial review.
Courts reviewing FOIA national security cases face serious
problems in deciding the weight to give various types of evidence
and in developing procedures that will closely model the adversarial setting. Courts appear to have resolved the question of evidentiary weight by interpreting broadly the Conference
Committee's reminder that courts should give "substantial
weight" to executive agency claims regarding "the details of the
classified status" of disputed information. 4 9 Meanwhile, evi147. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A) (1988).
148. Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 1.3(b), 3 C.F.R. 166, 169 (1983), reprintedin
50 U.S.C. § 401 note (1988). The preceding order, Executive Order No.
12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1979), specifically required the classifier to balance the
public interest in disclosure against the degree of harm release might cause.
149. For the text of the Conference Committee's remark, see supra text accompanying note 68.
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dence offered by plaintiffs to question the completeness or veracity of government affidavits appears to be given little or no
weight. If weighed at all, plaintiff's evidence is never strong
enough to overcome what has become a de facto presumption of
government victory once reasonably specific government affidavits are filed.
Judges dealing with these cases face a dilemma. Despitejudicial deference to agency judgments, judges must continue to review (b)(1) cases and try to make that review thorough and
meaningful. Some commentators argue that the inherently ambiguous meaning of "national security"-coupled with classification standards that are sweeping in the scope of information they
might be construed to protect-makes meaningful judicial review
in such cases impossible. 150 Congress recognized this dilemma,
but decided that the courts were the best place to subject executive agency decisions to impartial review. In Senator Muskie's
words, "[i]f courts cannot have full latitude to conduct that re15 1
view, no one can."'
Deferring to agency expertise, courts often accept as true all
government evidence and dispose of cases through summary
judgment, perhaps after encouraging negotiation between the
parties. This is probably the most common course for a (b)(1)
case today.' 5 2 Such a deferential review process is likely to yield
fair results only if the agency withholding the information sees
the threat of court-ordered disclosure as more than a remote possibility. Resolution of FOIA cases by summary judgment may
seem efficient, but such resolution only serves the public interest
if it produces a fair outcome for plaintiff-i.e., to the extent that
the agency releases the maximum amount of nonclassified material possible.
Where an agency cooperates fully with the plaintiff, conducts
a thorough review of all requested material and releases as much
information as possible, one might argue that the mere threat of
judicial review has greased the bureaucratic wheels sufficiently to
yield a fair outcome. This analysis places extreme faith in the wisdom of the classifiers. As Congress and the courts have recognized, however, an extremely deferential review standard gives
150. See Note, National Security and the Amended Freedom of Information Act, 85
L.J. 401 (1976) (arguing that the dependence of national security on policy
determinations would complicate judicial review under the amended FOIA).
151. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 44, at 305 (statement of Senator Muskie).
152. See Justice Dep't Guide, supra note 14, at 634 ("Summary judgment is the
vehicle by which virtually all FOIA cases are resolved.")
YALE
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the executive branch-the classifiers-too much credit. This is
true not only because of the inherent tendency of executive officials to withhold more information than is necessary to protect
national security, but also because the same officials and agencies
have repeatedly exhibited a penchant for "secret" activities
which, in retrospect, did not merit such status. Furthermore, the
reality of FOIA litigation does not counsel faith that judges can
maintain a "hands off" approach and fulfill the purpose of de
novo review. Many (b)(1) exemption cases involve large volumes
of information, recalcitrant agencies, and contested litigation.
The plaintiff must make repeated requests for administrative review before initiating litigation. In that process, the plaintiff must
negotiate with the agency over documents she has never seen,
and once an impasse is reached must hope the court will help
balance the scales by putting the government to a meaningful test
of its assertions regarding the classification of the information at
issue.
The agency in such cases has little incentive to disclose information because both parties know that the court is unlikely to order disclosure. In any event, plaintiffs are likely to abandon their
request unless they are among the few who have the time, money,
and lawyers necessary to pursue litigation. 153 What little incentive the agency may have to disclose documents may result from
the threat that, if the case proceeds to litigation, the agency will
likely be required to take the time to prepare a detailed index of
the withheld material and an affidavit attesting to the information's classified status. This prospect, however, is probably not
great enough to prompt additional disclosure or negotiation with
the plaintiff, especially as the process of drafting affidavits becomes routine and the agency is able to tailor its affidavits and
indexes to meet minimum standards announced by the courts in
other FOIA cases.
Another method courts could employ to resolve FOIA national security cases would involve the time-consuming and tedious process of routinely looking behind government affidavits
and attempting to verify that the information at issue is properly
classified. Putting aside the question of the burden this would
place on both courts and agencies, it is impossible to predict
153. Some cases take many years to resolve. See, e.g., Washington Post v.
United States Dep't of Defense, Civil Action No. 84-3400-LFO, slip op. at 39
(D.C. Cir. May 30, 1991) (court expressed hope that "this decade-old FOIA request will be resolved").
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whether such exacting scrutiny would result either in additional
voluntary disclosures by the agencies or disclosure orders by the
courts. Still, if judicial review in (b)(1) cases is to mean anything
more than summary affirmation of the truth of government affidavits, courts must devise procedures which assure that FOIA national security cases take into account the public interest in
information disclosure that Congress designed the FOIA to
protect.
De novo judicial review in FOIA national security cases
should not mean that courts will overrule legitimate decisions to
classify information. The document classification system as a
whole, of course, reflects the myriad policy decisions that collectively form the nation's perception of its "security" interests.
These policy choices are not what the courts are empowered to
decide in (b)(1) cases.
Judicial deference in (b)(1) cases, however, should be tempered by the FOIA presumption in favor of maximum disclosure.
This presumption requires the agency to prove to the court that
the decision to classify is valid and correct. 154 This process will
function smoothly only where the court strikes a balance between
requiring persuasive evidence that classification is necessary, on
the one hand, and deferring to agency judgment regarding the
types of information that must remain secret, on the other. There
is evidence that Congress was thinking along these lines in passing the 1974 amendments. Commenting on the amendment's
reference to "criteria established by an executive order," Congresswoman Mink said that "[t]his will give courts leeway to
probe into the justification of the classification itself ....
In effect, courts will be able to rule on whether disclosure actually
would bring about damage to the national security or on whatever
other test is set forth in the Executive order as justification for the
55
classification."]
The harm standard is one key to determine what judicial procedures would promote fair, efficient outcomes in FOIA (b)(1)
cases. Judicial deference to agency claims that disclosure of information will cause damage to national security serves the public
interest only if the results in actual cases inspire confidence that
154. For a general discussion of this concept, see
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw:

105 (1990).
155. SOURCE
Mink).

BOOK,

CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY,
RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 98-

supra note 44, at 260 (statement of Congresswoman
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such deference is, in fact, justified. If the information that is ultimately revealed (either through litigation or negotiation) turns
out to be obviously inconsequential, the public confidence in executive arguments for secrecy will be eroded. Similarly, the case
against judicial deference is stronger if the government clings to
unreasonable positions revealed through the course of litigation.
There is no doubt that the government has used the classified
label to hide apparently innocuous material from plaintiffs. Washington Post v. United States Department of Defense 156 is an ongoing
case involving a FOIA request for information on the failed mission to rescue American hostages in Iran in 1980. Seven years
into the litigation, the government agreed to review a sample of
documents designated by a special master as representing the
legal issues presented in the case.15 7 After this review, the government released additional portions of many of the documents. 158 Among the newly released documents were:
-a two-page document that turned out to be the text of
an Associated Press news report. In its Vaughn affidavit,
the government had not mentioned that the document
was a press report. 59
-a fifty-page transcript of a press conference given on a
"background basis" but "inadvertently" released to
news organizations. Even when confronted with an
identical copy of the document produced by plaintiff in
the course of the litigation, the government maintained
that the document remained properly classified because
160
it had not been "officially" disclosed.
The government only released these documents after the
156. 766 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991).
157. Id. at 4.
158. For further discussion of the proceedings in this case, one of the first
to employ a special master to assist the judge in framing the issues for ultimate
resolution by the court, see infra notes 236-67 and accompanying text.
159. Plaintiff-Intervenor's Reply to Defendant's Response to Plaintiff-Intervenor's Second Statement of the Issues at 5, Washington Post (Civil Action No. 843400-LFO)(filed January 18, 1991) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Reply].
160. See Plaintiff's Reply, supra note 159, at Exhibit B; Special Master's Description of Sample Documents at 2, Washington Post (Civil Action No. 84-3400LFO) (filed Dec. 21, 1989). The courts have generally rejected arguments that
the existence of similar information in the "public domain" suggests that the
government has waived the right to claim FOIA exemptions. See Ashfar v.
United States Dep't of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that
plaintiff bears burden of "pointing to specific information in the public domain
that appears to duplicate that being withheld").
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special master produced a report for the court summarizing the
arguments both sides could make regarding the sample documents. 61 The government's willingness to litigate over such matters reinforces arguments for more aggressive judicial review in
FOIA national security cases.
Courts have taken notice of similar government actions and
have suggested that they underscore the importance of the threat
of in camera review as an incentive for greater disclosure. In Ray
v. Turner,i 62 the concurring opinion noted that the CIA "found"

portions of documents that it could release after the lawsuit over
the documents began, despite the fact that during two other reviews the CIA found no segregable portions of the documents
and the agency had "flatly stat[ed] that no such portions existed." 63 Similarly, in Goland v. Central Intelligence Agency,1 64 the
agency disclosed to the plaintiff 321 documents one week after the
court of appeals had affirmed a lower court summary judgment
ruling for the government. 65 The agency admitted it had determined that the documents were relevant to the plaintiff's FOIA
request six months earlier.i66 As Chief Judge J. Skelly Wright
wrote in Ray, such cases "emphasiz[e] the difficulties that inhere
in permitting an agency to be the final judge of its own cause."' 16 7
VI.

IMPROVING THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN

FOIA

NATIONAL

SECURITY CASES

Chief Judge Wright's concurring opinion in Ray offers a
thoughtful examination of the appropriate role of the courts in
FOIA national security cases, and provides a useful starting point
for examining judicial procedures that may assist the courts in
carrying out the intent of Congress through the de novo review
process. His opinion urges the courts to conduct the de novo review required by Congress in the 1974 amendments without placing undue emphasis on the Conference Committee's admonition
regarding the "substantial weight" courts should give agency expertise. 168 Overemphasizing the Conference Committee language would risk creating a "broad presumption favoring all
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Washington Post, 766 F. Supp. at 4.
587 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1212 n.51 (Wright, C.J., concurring in the remand).
607 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
Id. at 375.
Id.
Ray, 587 F.2d at 1213 n.51 (Wright, C.J., concurring in the remand).
Id. at 1214 (Wright, C.J., concurring in the remand).
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agency affidavits in national security cases."' 6 9 This, ChiefJudge
Wright believed, "would contradict the clear provisions of the
statute and would render meaningless Congress' obvious intent
in passing these provisions over the President's specific
170
objections."'
ChiefJudge Wright also gave his colleagues advice on the fair
treatment of (b)(1) cases and recommended procedures-all of
which had already been tried with varying degrees of success by
other judges-to resolve difficult issues. For instance, he suggested that the plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel should have limited
access to the disputed documents, whenever possible, "a step that
seems essential if the plaintiff is to challenge the accuracy of the
government's characterization of the documents in true 'adver17 1
sary' fashion."'
Chief Judge Wright viewed greater use of in camera inspection as a way to "increase[] the 'adversariness' of the proceeding
...by allowing the court to test the accuracy of the agency's representations."' 7 2 He noted that obstacles to in camera review
could be minimized by either limiting access to classified documents to court personnel with security clearances or by appointing properly cleared special masters.' 73 ChiefJudge Wright
pointed out that courts had dealt with large volumes of information in other FOIA cases by reviewing only samples of the withheld material.' 74 He urged judges to conduct in camera review if
government affidavits do not clear up a "dispute of fact concerning the nature or contents of the documents sought to be pro169. Id. at 1213 (Wright, C.J., concurring in the remand).
170. Id. (Wright, C.J., concurring in the remand).
171. Id. at 1205 n.24 (Wright, C.J., concurring in the remand). Judge
Wright noted that FOIA plaintiffs had asked to be granted access to classified
documents under terms of a protective order in Hayden v. CIA, Civil Action No.
76-284 (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 1976). Id. at 1212 (Wright, C.J., concurring in the remand). The Senate Report also recognized the disadvantage to plaintiffs of conducting in camera review without the plaintiffs' participation and encouraged
plaintiff access to the documents "whenever possible." See SOURCE BOOK, supra
note 44, at 166-67 (reprintingS. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)).
172. Ray, 587 F.2d at 1212 (Wright, C.J., concurring in the remand).
173. Id. at 1211 (Wright, C.J., concurring in the remand).
174. Id. (Wright, C.J., concurring in the remand) (citing Mead Data Cent.,
Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 262 n.59 (D.C. Cir.
1977) ("court could selectively employ in camera inspection to verify the agency's
descriptions and provide assurances ... to FOIA plaintiffs that the descriptions
are accurate"); see also Ash Grove Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 511
F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (district judge inspected two of four categories of
information involved); Fensterwald v. CIA, 443 F. Supp. 667 (D.D.C. 1977)
(sampling of withheld items was justified when agency ran serious risk of compromising national security secrets by disclosure).
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duced," if the government "affidavits or testimony" do not
demonstrate that the information is "clearly exempt and that no
segregable portions remain," or if the court suspects "bad faith"
by the government.175
Along lines similar to those outlined by Judge Wright in Ray,
some courts have followed procedures in national security cases
designed to allow themselves to test more carefully government
withholding claims without "second-guessing" the executive classification decision. These procedures fall into three general
categories:
1) document description and index requirements that
allow the plaintiff to prepare credible and informed
legal arguments in favor of disclosure and that allow
the court to verify that documents are properly classified ("index requirements");
2) admission into the record of evidence contrary to the
government affidavits, including plaintiff's evidence
about the nature of the disputed documents and evidence of government bad faith ("contrary evidence");
3) use of special masters to help the court evaluate government affidavits, weigh contrary evidence, and
facilitate in camera review if necessary ("special
masters").
A.

Index Requirements

The most significant judicial invention designed to balance
the scales in FOIA litigation was established in 1973 in Vaughn v.
Rosen.1 76 Vaughn established the principle that in most cases the
government must provide the court and the plaintiff with a detailed "description" of the withheld material and the justification
for withholding.1 7 7 This requirement was designed to increase
the adversariness of the FOIA litigation process by providing
plaintiffs with information on which they could base arguments in
favor of disclosure, and to place the burden of justifying with78
holding squarely on the government.
The Vaughn system of "specificity, separation, and indexing"
is designed to:
175. Ray, 587 F.2d at 1212, 1214 (Wright, C.J., concurring in remand).

176. 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
177. Id. at 826-27.
178. Id. at 827.
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1) assure that a party's right to information is not submerged beneath governmental obfuscation and mischaracterization, and
2) permit the court system effectively and efficiently to
evaluate the factual nature of disputed infor79
mation.'
In all FOIA cases courts and parties have struggled with the
distortion of the adversarial process that inevitably arises from
the plaintiff's lack of precise knowledge concerning the concealed
documents. As the Vaughn court observed, "the party with the
greatest interest in obtaining disclosure is at a loss to argue with
desirable legal precision for the revelation of the concealed information."' 80 Even if the court inspects the documents in camera
to test the accuracy of government arguments in favor of withholding, that examination is undertaken "without benefit of criticism and illumination by a party with the actual interest in forcing
disclosure."''8 When the government seeks to withhold based on
the (b)(1) exemption, the court's traditional deference to executive branch judgment relating to national security and foreign affairs magnifies these distortions to the adversarial process. 8 2
A court will review documents in camera only if it is not convinced of the propriety of the classification on the basis of the
government's pleadings and Vaughn affidavits.' 8 3 Because in camera inspection is viewed as a last resort, government affidavits are
the most critical part of the record, and decisions often turn on
179. Id. at 826.
180. Id. at 823.
181. Id. at 825.
182. As set forth in King v. United States Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210
(D.C. Cir. 1987), if the government claims the national security exemption, the
index must at least:
1) identify the document, by type and location in the body of documents requested;
2) note that Exemption 1 is claimed;
3) describe the document withheld or any redacted portion thereof,
disclosing as much information as possible without thwarting the exemption's purpose;
4) explain how this material falls within one or more of the categories
of classified information authorized by the governing executive order; and
5) explain how disclosure of the material in question would cause the
requisite degree of harm to the national security.
Id. at 224.
183. See Hayden v. National Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 608 F.2d 1381,
1387 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("[I]n camera review is neither necessary nor appropriate"
if the agency's affidavits are acceptable.).
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the adequacy of the government's document descriptions and justifications for continued withholding.184 Thus, the likelihood that
the government ultimately will disclose information is a function
of judicial decisions outlining minimum standards for the agency
affidavit.
Court interpretations of the index requirement suggest the
critical nature of the document descriptions in the judicial review
process. In King v. Department ofJustice,185 a case involving access
to FBI surveillance files on a deceased civil rights attorney, the
court noted that "categorical description of redacted material
coupled with categorical indication of anticipated consequences
of disclosure is clearly inadequate."''8 6 Similarly, the court in
Powell v. United States Department ofJustice,18 7 held that the Vaughn
index must allow the plaintiff and the court to make an
"independent assessment of the validity of the claimed
exemptions." 88
The index requirement serves many purposes in (b)(1) litigation, the most important of which is to create a detailed public
record that allows plaintiffs to put forward their best arguments in
favor of disclosure.18 9 The Vaughn index also forces the government to show the court that the government has released all "reasonably segregable" nonclassified portions of the documents, as
required under the 1974 FOIA amendments. 90
The courts have adopted a flexible approach in evaluating
government document descriptions. Depending on the circumstances, the index may be a narrative, or a system of annotated or
cross-referenced excerpts of documents coded to indicate why
the exemption applies. In circumstances in which the government cannot possibly describe the information without revealing
secrets, courts have accepted and reviewed classified indexes in
camera.
In a few national security cases courts have found the government's index inadequate. The index in Allen v. Central Intelligence
184. See id.
185. 830 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
186. Id. at 224 (citing Dellums v. Powell, 642 F.2d 1351, 1360 n.29 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)).
187. 584 F. Supp. 1508 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
188. Id. at 1514.
189. See Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights v. INS, 721 F. Supp. 552, 568
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
190. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988) ("Any reasonably segregable portion of a
record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of
the portions which are exempt under this subsection.").
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Agency, 19 1

for example, was insufficient because it was based
mainly on conclusory descriptions that simply recited the criteria
19 2
of the executive order and the language of the statute itself.
Courts have rejected other indexes because they claim exemptions for more than one reason but do not state which rationale
for withholding applies to which withheld material. 93
While a primary function of the index is to allow the plaintiff
to formulate meaningful arguments in favor of disclosure, a review of Vaughn index document descriptions in sample (b)(1)
cases shows how difficult the plaintiff's task can be. The concept
of describing the documents in order to enable the court to conduct further review, or to let the plaintiff mount an adequate argument in favor of disclosure, often seems lost in what is
sometimes referred to as the "boilerplate Vaughn."' 194 A boiler-

plate Vaughn purports to "describe" the withheld material, but actually says very little that would allow the court to determine
whether the information is properly withheld. Such affidavits
often repeatedly refer the reader to the executive order, or to a
generic portion of the government affidavit outlining in vague
terms the harm to national security likely to occur if the information is revealed. For good measure, such affidavits generally state
that the government has released all "reasonably segregable"
nonclassified material (unless that information is subject to another FOIA exemption).
The court and plaintiff are left with an affidavit that states
little more than what the government was required to certify in
order to win summary judgment under the analysis of Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink.' 9 5 Although the affidavit always includes a general statement explaining why the information sought
is protected under one or more of the ambiguous categories of
the executive order, true document descriptions that allow meaningful argument of the merit of withholding are exceedingly
rare. 196
A review of actual Vaughn affidavits shows how the govern191. 636 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
192. Id. at 1291.

193. See Branch v. FBI, 658 F. Supp. 204, 208 (D.D.C. 1987) (index rejected
because court had to "guess which reason or reasons apply to each deletion").
194. See, e.g., Wiener v. FBI, 943 F.2d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting text
of "boilerplate Vaughn").
195. 410 U.S. 73 (1973). For a further discussion of Mink, see supra notes
45-49 and accompanying text.
196. Wiener, 943 F.2d at 979.
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ment can appear to describe documents while disclosing little that
allows the plaintiff to formulate meaningful contrary arguments
or assists the court in resolving the case. Bonner v. United States
Department of State' 9 7 involved a request for documents on U.S.
government dealings with the former Marcos regime in the Philippines. After disclosing some information, the government filed
an affidavit claiming the remaining documents were exempt
under (b)(1), mainly for reasons relating to diplomatic confidentiality.'19 The affidavit contained a lengthy section on why the release of particular documents would cause harm to U.S. security,
but contained little specific information about the material being
withheld.' 9 9
For example, one document was described as "a confidential
proposal ... relating to coordinated action on this foreign relations problem by a number of named countries." The description
noted that
it is not clear whether any or all of the
concerned had been consulted as to this
and it is likely that at least some of them
as improper on the part of the U.S.
breach the proposal unilaterally to
200
government.

other countries
possible action,
would regard it
government to
the Philippine

The government concluded that disclosure of this document
would "be regarded by foreign officials . . .as evidence of U.S.
government unwillingness or inability to preserve diplomatic confidentiality... [and would] be exploited by foreign elements opposed to U.S. foreign relations objectives."-2 0 ' While such
descriptions may seem persuasive at first glance, they do little to
allow the plaintiff to formulate counter-arguments or allow a
judge to determine that the agency has properly classified the
information.
197. 724 F. Supp. 1028 (D.D.C. 1989), vacated and remanded, 928 F.2d 1148
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
198. Bonner v. United States Dep't of State, 928 F.2d 1148, 1149 & n.3
(State Department submitted declaration ofJohn Eaves, Deputy Director of Office of Mandatory Review and of Classification and Declassification Center of
Department of State).
199. Declaration of John Eaves at 55-56; Bonner, 724 F. Supp. 1028.
200. Declaration of John Eaves at 55-56. Similar language appears
throughout the 143 page index to the withheld documents. The trial court held
that the index was adequate. See Bonner, 724 F. Supp. at 1030-32. The plaintiff
did not challenge the adequacy of the index on appeal. Bonner, 928 F.2d at 1151
n.8.
201. Declaration ofJohn Eaves at 55-56.
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A comparison of Vaughn index descriptions with the documents (or portions of documents) ultimately disclosed may make
one doubt the seriousness of the "damage" to national security
cited in the typical Vaughn index. In Washington Post v. Department
of Defense,20 2 for example, a portion of a document declassified
during the litigation included the revelation that box lunches for
helicopter pilots who fly long missions over a desert should not
include milk because it might spoil in the heat. 20 3 The government description of that document in the Vaughn index stated that
release of any portion of the document would cause "exceptionally grave damage to the national security." In the same case, the
court found a description inadequate because it described a 250page document in seven pages. The court faulted the government for failing to describe the information contained in each
04
withheld portion of the document. 2
In an ongoing case over access to documents relating to the
Cuban Missile Crisis, the government filed a twenty-six volume
Vaughn index (approximately 1,500 pages) purporting to describe
each withheld document. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a supplemental index, 20 5 citing numerous insufficiencies in the government's submission, including the fact that the government
claimed the (b)(1) exemption for some previously released
2 06
documents.
In its motion, the plaintiff argued that the government affidavits were filled with meaningless descriptions, including thirty
documents that were described merely as containing records of
''conversations or other communications" relating to Cuba and
the Missile Crisis.2 0 7 Other documents were referred to as potential "grist for foreign propaganda mills." 20 8 One twelve-page
document was described simply as "this document appears to be
20 9
a portion of a larger draft analysis and proposal for action."
There is no clear formula for a Vaughn affidavit that allows
true adversarial testing of the government's withholding claim in
202. 766 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991).
203. Plaintiff's Reply, supra note 159, at 2.
204. Washington Post, 766 F. Supp. at 15.
205. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel a Supplemental Vaughn Declaration, Brenner v. United States Dep't of State, Civil Action No. 88-0034 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 1990).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 14.
208. Id. at 16.
209. Id. at 22.
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a FOIA national security case. Still, the courts should allow their
own past rulings in this area to guide them, and require government submissions that describe the withheld material in sufficient
detail to allow the plaintiff to formulate meaningful arguments in
favor of disclosure. Unless the Vaughn index truly serves that purpose, the use of the Vaughn procedure as a substitute for in camera review cannot be justified.
B.

Contrary Evidence

Courts have repeatedly held that agency affidavits are only
"sufficient" if they are "neither controverted by contrary record
evidence nor impugned by bad faith on the part of the
agency." 2 10 It is not clear from the case law, however, what constitutes such "contrary evidence" or "agency bad faith," and what
evidentiary weight the court should give such evidence when it is
produced. In one case, Powell v. Department ofJustice,21' the court
found bad faith in the agency's "inexcusable delays" and "inadequate responses," and ordered disclosure of some information.
Ultimately, however, the government was permitted to withhold
the information under a settlement agreement. 2 12 Powell aside,
research reveals no (b)(1) case in which a court has rejected the
government's affidavits or ordered disclosure on the basis of government bad faith.
Judicial opinions have not specifically defined either bad faith
or contrary evidence in the context of (b)(1) cases, except to say,
as in Goldberg v. Department of State, 2 13 that "contrary evidence
must somehow undermine or call into question the correctness of
the classification status of the withheld information, or the
agency's explanation for the classification." 2 1 4 Plaintiffs have
tried-with little success-to introduce what they believe is either
"contrary evidence" or evidence of agency "bad faith.'' 2t 5
210. King v. United States Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C. Cir.
1987). This same view has been expressed in roughly the same words in numerous cases. See, e.g., Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984); McGehee v. CIA, 697 F.2d 1095, 1112 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in part on reh'g, 711 F.2d
1076 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 970 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Military Audit
Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
211. 584 F. Supp. 1508, 1515 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
212. See Justice Dept Guide, supra note 14, at 412.
213. 818 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 904 (1988).
214. Id. at 81.
215. See, e.g., Silets v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 945 F.2d 227, 231 (7th
Cir. 1991) (trial court did not abuse itsdiscretion by refusing to conduct an in
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In some cases, courts have dismissed as irrelevant affidavits
submitted by plaintiffs to question the basis for keeping information classified, because only the official currently responsible for
classification is seen as being in a position to evaluate the reasons
for withholding. 21 6 Courts have also rejected testimony that withheld information is similar or identical to documents already in
the public domain. 2 17 Courts have reasoned that only the government, which has possession of the documents, can compare them
to public domain information and verify similarity. 2 18 Evidence
that foreign officials have waived objections to disclosure of information also has been questioned as unofficial and improper for
2 19
consideration by the court.
Similarly, plaintiffs can only surmise what might constitute
agency bad faith by reviewing arguments that have been rejected.
Releasing documents in a piecemeal fashion over the course of
protracted litigation (sometimes seemingly in direct proportion
to the annoyance the judge exhibits toward the agency), is not
evidence of bad faith. 220 Courts have reasoned that such a holding would discourage future agency cooperation. 22 ' An incomplete or inaccurate Vaughn index is apparently not evidence of bad
faith; 222 the usual remedy is to require the production of a better
index. 22 3 A government decision to release documents in the
midst of litigation does not constitute a waiver of arguments with
respect to other withheld documents, nor does it make agency
affidavits "suspect." 2 24 Such a ruling would "work mischief in the
future by creating a disincentive for an agency to reappraise its
camera review before upholding agency's right to withhold documents where
plaintiff alleged, but could not prove, bad faith).
216. For a discussion of cases in which courts have rejected plaintiffs'
counter-affidavits, see supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
217. See Ashfar v. United States Dep't of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1134 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (although similar information might be widely circulated, documents
may still be classified to avoid "authoritative official announcements" that might
harm national security).
218. See id. at 1129-35 (because government is in sole possession of requested documents, only government can compare those documents to released
documents and determine similarity).
219. See Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control v. United States Dep't
of Energy, 766 F. Supp. 318, 324 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (fact that Soviet officials waived
objections to disclosure of joint nuclear weapons testing documents held to be
improper subject of court consideration).
220. See Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
221. See id. at 953.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 954.
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position," and "[i]t would be unwise [for the court] to punish
flexibility, lest [the court] provide the motivation for
22 5
intransigence."
Courts should give plaintiffs in (b)(1) cases the opportunity
to present their own evidence that either undermines the agency's
exemption arguments or tends to show that the agency has not
complied with the request on a good-faith basis. Because courts
have not defined the parameters of such evidence and the weight
it will be given in the de novo review process, plaintiffs cannot
make effective legal arguments in favor of disclosure.
In the meantime, plaintiffs have continued efforts to introduce their own evidence in (b)(1) cases. One recent attempt involved affidavits from government officials who wrote or received
specific classified documents relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2 26 The plaintiff offered such evidence to challenge the sufficiency of the government's document descriptions. In Brenner,
the plaintiff argued that "the obvious deficiency of the [Vaughn]
Declaration is demonstrated by the affidavits of several high-ranking Kennedy Administration officials who.., worked closely with
these very documents-even they cannot determine from their review of the [Vaughn] Declaration the substance of the documents
or the bases for their withholding." 22 7 The case remains under
consideration, but regardless of the outcome it may provide a
model of the type of plaintiffs' evidence that courts could weigh in
the process of de novo review.
It seems logical that former officials-such as the affiants in
the Brenner case-may have knowledge that could be used to assist
courts in verifying the accuracy of a government Vaughn index.
Information obtained through such persons may also shed light
on which, if any, contested information the judge might inspect in
camera. Such evidence would not necessarily challenge the decision to keep documents classified. Instead, evidence offered by
such plaintiffs' "experts" would comment on the accuracy of the
index itself, and provide the court with a useful tool to evaluate
225. Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 753-54 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
226. Brenner v. United States Dep't of State, Civil Action No. 88-0034
(D.D.C. filed Jan. 7, 1988). Brenner, which involves a request for documents relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis, was pending before Judge Norma Holloway
Johnson in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia at the
time this article was written.
227. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel a Supplemental Vaughn Declaration, Brenner, Civil Action No. 88-0034 (D.D.C. filed Jan.
7, 1988).
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105

arguments relating to the classification status of the withheld
documents.
C.

Use of Special Masters

A judge in a FOIA case involving the national security exemption might be motivated to appoint a special master to help
narrow the legal and factual issues and to resolve the case efficiently. Use of special masters in the (b)(1) context is not a new
idea.2 2 8 The Vaughn court recommended that if the "raw material" of a FOIA lawsuit is extremely burdensome, the trial court
may consider designating a special master to "assist the adversary
process by assuming much of the burden of examining and evaluating voluminous documents that currently falls on the trial
judge." 2 29 Congress also expected judges to use special masters
2 30
to assist them in resolving difficult cases.
Using special masters in FOIA national security cases offers a
number of potential advantages. In cases involving many documents, the prospect of time consuming in camera review may influence courts to decide a case on the strength of affidavits alone.
Employing a special master may reduce this tendency by easing
the burden of reviewing a large number of documents. After
meeting with the parties, choosing a sample, and reviewing the
documents, the master could prepare a detailed analysis of the
issues to assist the judge in making the ultimate decision whether
to order disclosure of the documents. Using a master to select a
document sample also might reduce arguments over appropriate
sampling methods and narrow the issues for the court to resolve.
Furthermore, the master could conduct meetings with the parties
to facilitate resolution of legal and factual issues, giving both par23
ties a chance to develop their case. '
228. See, e.g., Linda Silberman, JudicialAdjuncts Revisited: The Proliferationof
Ad Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2155-56 (1989). Such procedures
were also considered by Congress. See SOURCE BOOK, supra note 44, at 167-68
(reprinting S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)).
229. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 977 (1974).
230. See SOURCE BooK, supra note 44, at 167 (reprinting S. REP. No. 854,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)). Some in Congress also proposed that judges could
be assisted by a Freedom of Information Commission "which could develop expertise in this area and act as a master in chancery or an adviser to the court."
Id. at 247 (statement of Congressman Erlenborn).
231. Plaintiffs and their counsel are generally excluded from participation
in in camera proceedings, especially in (b)(l) cases. In Salisbury v. United
States, 690 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the court of appeals found "no error" in
the district court's decision to exclude plaintiff's attorney from the court's re-
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The use of special masters in FOIA cases may also have drawbacks. The cost of using special masters in complicated cases may
be prohibitive. The issue of who pays for the master likely will
generate additional litigation. The issue of how to select special
masters for sensitive national security cases also must be resolved.
Individuals with proper security clearances, not to mention time
to spare, may be in short supply, and the parties may object to the
judge's choice of a master. Finally, at least one judge has suggested that using a special master in a (b)(1) case will not save
judicial resources, because only the judge can make the final determination regarding exemption.2 3 2
Special masters have seldom been drawn upon in FOIA
(b)(1) cases, but experience in a current case provides a model for
using this innovative procedure in difficult (b)(1) cases. In Washington Post v. United States Department of Defense,23 3 the court appointed a special master to select a representative sample of
withheld documents and summarize the legal arguments that
both sides could make. 23 4 A more detailed examination of that
case provides insight into how using a special master may give the
courts a way to provide the litigants with a procedure that more
closely approaches the adversarial process, and that helps judges
provide meaningful de novo review in national security cases.
The case arose from a FOIA request by Washington Post reporter Scott Armstrong2 3 5 for approximately 2,000 documents
view of a classified Vaughn index. Id. at 973. The court reasoned that "danger to
the national security, delay, and ethical considerations" justified excluding the
plaintiff. Id. Similarly, the court in Weberman v. NSA, 668 F.2d 676 (2d Cir.
1982), held that the "risk presented by participation of counsel ... outweighs
the utility of counsel, or adversary process," in reviewing a classified government affidavit. Id. at 678.
Short of obtaining security clearances for plaintiff's counsel, one way of partially accommodating plaintiffs in this situation might be through the process of
using special masters in (b)(l) cases. Through that process, plaintiff's counsel
and government counsel meet with the masters to narrow the issues, which naturally gives the plaintiff's lawyer additional insights regarding the government's
reasons for withholding information and may promote negotiated resolution of
some issues.
232. In re United States Dep't of Defense, 848 F.2d 232, 240 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (Starr, J., dissenting) ("If the trial judge carefully reviews each decision
made by the master, it is doubtful that the judicial time or resources will have
been conserved to any significant degree.").
233. 766 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991).
234. Id. at 4. The decision by Judge Oberdorfer of the District Court for
the District of Columbia survived a petition for a writ of mandamus brought by
the defendant Department of Defense. See In re United States Dep't of Defense,
848 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
235. Armstrong left the Post during the course of the lawsuit and was later
added as plaintiff-intervenor, while the Post withdrew from the litigation.
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relating to the failed attempt in 1980 to rescue U.S. hostages in
Iran. 2 36 The Department of Defense withheld nearly all of the
documents-which consisted of about 14,000 pages-under the
2 37
(b) (1) exemption.
After reviewing the unclassified Vaughn index, Judge Louis
Oberdorfer of the District Court for the District of Columbia announced that he was considering appointing a special master to
review the withheld documents. 238 While the plaintiff supported
the idea of a master, the government opposed it. Hoping to persuade the judge to grant summary judgment on the basis of government affidavits alone, the government instead submitted a
more detailed, but classified, document index. Furthermore, the
government proposed that the judge decide whether the (b)(1)
exemption applied by reviewing in camera a government-chosen
"random sample" of the documents.
Not satisfied with that proposal, Judge Oberdorfer instead
wrote a Notice to Counsel explaining why he felt engaging the
assistance of a master was better than any of the alternative ways
to review the documents and to shed light on the legal issues involved. He cited difficulty obtaining security clearances for his
law clerks and other court personnel who would be involved if the
court were to conduct sampling or other document review. He
also questioned the wisdom of allowing the government to select
a document sample for review by the court, stating that "the integrity of sampling by the government has been authoritatively
questioned.- 239 Finally, the judge rejected random sampling as
not "particularly appropriate for the circumstances here." 240
Judge Oberdorfer reasoned that "[t]he best solution" would
be to appoint a special master who held or had recently held an
appropriate security clearance to review the documents, and to
"focus the master's responsibility on developing the sample and
summarizing to the [c]ourt the arguments that each party has
made, or could make, with respect to the exemptions claimed by
defendant." 24' Sensitive to his responsibility under the Federal
236. Washington Post, 766 F. Supp. at 3.
237. As is common in (b)(l) cases, some documents were found to contain
nonclassified material and were released in redacted form. Id. at 8.
238. Id. at 4.
239. Notice to Counsel at 2, Washington Post v. United States Dep't of Defense, 766 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991) (Civil Action No. 84-3400-LFO) (dated Dec.
14, 1987).
240. Id.
241. Id. Judge Oberdorfer asked the parties to submit names of candidates
for the special master role, and ultimately decided to appoint Kenneth Bass, who
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Rules of Civil Procedure2 4 2 not to delegate decisionmaking authority to a special master 2 43 Judge Oberdorfer carefully circumscribed the master's role. He noted that "the [c]ourt's Article III
role would be preserved, and indeed enhanced beyond that performed by the [c]ourt in an in camera review," because ultimate
adjudication would be based on: 1) the master's expertise in
choosing the representative sample of documents; 2) the court's
appraisal of the method the master used to select and review the
samples; 3) the court's consideration of the litigants' potential arguments for and against disclosure as produced in a report to the
court by the special master; and 4) any additional arguments the
parties would make as a result of the special master's review and
report to the court. 24 4 Finally, Judge Oberdorfer wrote that the
master would "make no recommendation" regarding document
2 45
disclosure.
The government sought a writ of mandamus against the
judge based on his appointment of the special master, arguing
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a "special
condition" must exist that "requires" the appointment of a special master, and that the judge could have used alternative proce24 6
dures to resolve the case.
In response to the government's petition, Judge Oberdorfer
took the unusual step of writing a memorandum to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit about his decision to
appoint a special master, pointing out that this case is "somewhat
different [than other petitions for a writ of mandamus] because it
may require consideration of the appropriate modus operandi for
district judges responsible for resolving disputes under FOIA
about voluminous, highly sensitive documents without benefit of
impartial expert testimony, adversary process, or normal law clerk
had been proposed by the plaintiff. Mr. Bass is a Washington lawyer who had
experience with the government on intelligence and national security issues.
242. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b) ("[R]eference [to a master] shall be made only
upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it.").
243. The issue of authority under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b) to
appoint a special master in this type of case is analyzed in detail in an article by
Judge Patricia Wald, who was on the panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that upheld Judge Oberdorfer's decision. See Patricia
M. Wald, "Some Exceptional.Condition"--The Anatomy of a Decision Under FederalRule
of Civil Procedure53(b), 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 405 (1988).
244. Notice to Counsel at 2, Washington Post (Civil Action No. 84-3400LFO).
245. Id.
246. In re United States Dep't of Defense, 848 F.2d 232 (D.C.Cir. 1988).
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assistance." 24 7 He wrote that his decision to appoint a special
master was informed by his experience with a previous (b)(1)
case, Nishnic v. United States Department of Justice,24 8 a "much less
technical and sensitive FOIA case" that took "several months in
1987 with valuable law clerk assistance, but without a special
24 9
master."
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit denied the writ of mandamus. 2 50 The appeals court viewed the appointment of a special master as a pragmatic solution that fulfilled the needs of the trial judge, while it
avoided improper delegation of the court's responsibility to rule
on the ultimate issues in the case. 25 1 Judge Patricia Wald, who
wrote the majority opinion, commented in a law review article
that Judge Oberdorfer faced one of the "exceptional conditions"
that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b) allowed him to
exercise his discretion to appoint a special master. 252 Put simply,
the judge "needed a security-cleared expert fast, if the trial was to
move ahead." 253 The panel decision was also swayed by the observation that the special master's job in Washington Post was similar to masters' roles in overseeing document production in the
pretrial phase of other complex civil cases. 254 Courts have
deemed such instances of "unusual discovery" to constitute sufficient "exceptional" conditions to warrant using a special
master. 25 5 Particularly noteworthy was the court's observation
that the case required a special master because "tilt involves a
FOIA claim with respect to which the judge has no access to impartial expert witnesses or other features of the adversary process
in order to assist him in making his decision about disclosure." 25 6
Does the presence of the special master give plaintiffs a bet247. Memorandum from Judge Oberdorfer to the Clerk of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, February 17, 1988,
regarding In re United States Dep't of Defense, 671 F. Supp. 771 (D.D.C.), aff'd,
828 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Oberdorfer Memorandum].
248. 671 F. Supp. 771 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 828 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
249. Oberdorfer Memorandum, supra note 247, at 1.
250. In re United States Dept. of Defense, 848 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(denying writ because mandamus is extraordinary remedy and Judge
Oberdorfer did not abuse discretion).
251. Id. at 239.
252. Wald, supra note 243, at 416.
253. Id.
254. In re Dept of Defense, 848 F.2d at 235, n.5.
255. Id. Judge Starr dissented, focusing on whether this case "required"
appointing a special master. Id. at 239-43 (Starr, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 236.
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ter chance to mount their strongest legal and factual arguments,
and thus improve the quality of the de novo review process?
Although there has not been enough experience to draw general
conclusions, some of the answers to these questions are already
apparent in the conduct of the Washington Post case since the special master began his work.
The special master began meeting with the parties to attempt
to narrow the plaintiff's request, and the special master directed
the government to prepare a list of documents that presented
common legal issues. 25 7 After reviewing the entire classified
Vaughn index and some of the actual documents, the special
master informed the parties that he saw two ways to approach further document review and selection of a representative sample for
analysis. 258 The first model would focus on a sample from various sets of documents with common factual content; the second
alternative was to select a sample that was "fairly representative
of the legal issues presented by the documents." 259 He chose the
second alternative, with the thought that a sample based on the
legal issues raised by the withheld documents would lead to rulings that would be "sufficiently dispositive or controlling that
they would significantly reduce the scope of any further
26 0
proceedings.
A few months later, the special master identified the legal issues for the parties and received further comments from both
parties. 26 1 Soon after, the master announced that he had selected
26 2
twenty-five representative documents for in-depth analysis.
Four other documents were added to the sample in response to a
request by the plaintiff.26 3 The master then prepared a draft description of the sample documents and submitted it to the government for classification review. 26 4 Once that review was
completed, both parties and the court were given the master's description of the sample documents. 26 5
After conducting another FOIA review, the government re257. Report of the Special Master at 5, Washington Post v. United States
Dep't of Defense, 766 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991) (Civil Action No. 84-3400-LFO)
(filed Dec. 21, 1989).
258. Id. at 8.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 9.
262. Id. at 10.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 11.
265. Id.
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leased some portions of the sample documents.2 66 Judge
Oberdorfer recently issued a memorandum opinion ruling on
some of the legal issues raised in the master's report, and approving the government's decision to conduct a fresh review of the
entire population of withheld documents in light of the master's
recommendations.

26 7

Although it is too early to cite the Washington Post case as a
model for future (b)(1) cases, the experience so far suggests that
special masters can at least be employed for limited purposes in
such cases, saving court time and facilitating resolution of the issues between the parties.
CONCLUSION

After twenty-five years of experience with the landmark public access law known as the Freedom of Information Act, it is clear
that the broad meaning given to the term national security
through exemption (b)(1) of the FOIA has impeded the flow of
vital information to the public. Congress has expressed its intent
that the federal courts review executive agency decisions to withhold information from the public. The courts, however, have interpreted the legislative history of the FOIA to severely limit their
de novo review power in cases involving classified information.
When the government attempts to withhold information
from a FOIA requester for reasons of "national security," it must
prove that the information is "properly classified." Instead of defining these critical terms in the FOIA, Congress chose to adopt
the standard of the Executive Order on Classification, which currently allows information to be classified only if its unauthorized
disclosure "reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the
national security." The difficult-some would say impossibletask of assuring that the government proves that "damage" may
be the result of disclosure has fallen to the courts as they decide
FOIA cases involving classified documents.
This article contends that the courts do not lack the tools
necessary to carry out the de novo review that the FOIA requires
in cases involving national security information. Using these
tools, the courts must exercise the review power Congress has
given them. This means overturning executive agency decisions
266. Washington Post v. United States Dep't of Defense, 766 F. Supp. 1, 5
(D.D.C. 1991) (Civil Action No. 84-3400-LFO) (filed Dec. 21, 1989).
267. Id.
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to withhold information if the government does not meet its burden of proof.
More vigilant judicial oversight in this area should involve
greater use of potentially labor-intensive procedures that may
serve to balance the adversarial scale in litigation over national
security information. These procedures may include greater reliance on extra-judicial assistants such as special masters to assist
courts in the fact-finding process. Courts should also intensify
their scrutiny of government affidavits that purport to describe
the withheld documents and to justify withholding on national security grounds. Finally, courts should review carefully all evidence the plaintiff presents that might undermine the
government's position.
Such fine-tuning of the adjudication process in FOIA national security cases would add balance to this type of litigation by
putting the burden of proof on the government to justify withholding documents, and by providing plaintiffs with the factual
information necessary to present such cases in an adversarial
manner. These procedures should also assist courts in finding
facts upon which to base their decisions on the central question
these cases present: Is the withheld information properly
classified?
Improvements in the process of judicial review of government decisions to withhold information on grounds of national
security may or may not lead to greater disclosure. Despite this
unknown, judicial activism in this area is necessary if the principles of public access embodied in the FOIA are to be upheld.
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